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Introduction 
Remunicipalisation – or the return of water services to full public ownership, management, and 
democratic control following a period of privatisation – is an emerging trend in urban governance and 
its international diffusion has accelerated significantly since the turn of the century, particularly in 
Europe. Globally, the number of cases where local government has remunicipalised water services 
increased from two in two countries in March 2000 to 235 cases in 37 countries by March 2015. Two 
countries accounted for the majority of cases: France with 94 cases and the US with 58 cases.3 The 
total number of cases has continued to grow since 2015,4 and it is significant that local authorities in 
France – the country that has come to symbolise water privatisation - are remunicipalising water 
services at a faster pace than anywhere else. The evidence is that water remunicipalisation is here to 
stay as it has become an established policy option.5  
 
Despite the growing trend of water remunicipalisation, pressures to adopt Public-Private Partnerships 
(PPPs) and other forms of privatisation remain unabated due to austerity and the seductive power 
exerted over local authorities by old and new promises of private sector efficiency, finance, and 
technological innovation.6 However, decisions to remunicipalise are often made in response to the 
problems of private water management - from lack of infrastructure investments, to tariff hikes and 
environmental hazards.7 Thus the emergence of the remunicipalisation trend offers an opportunity to 
reassess the public vs. private debate from a fresh perspective – laying bare the limitations and 
potential of both the public sector and the private sector in the delivery of essential public services. 
For these reasons, it should come to no surprise that water remunicipalisation is increasingly 
attracting policy and scholarly interest. The literature has devoted greater attention to the policy 
process of remunicipalisation – including the motivations of governmental decisions to 
remunicipalise,8 social mobilisation and collective action as determinants of remuncipalisation,9 and 
the policy diffusion of remunicipalisation10 - than its policy outcome. Indeed, the impact of 
remunicipalisation on public service performance remains under-researched.11 As a result, important 
questions remain unanswered regarding the extent to which remunicipalisation improves service 
quality, enhances investment, and fosters equality of access in comparison to private management. 
In other words, does remunicipalisation constitute progressive, emancipatory and sustainable change 
for water services and local communities?       
 
To address the knowledge gap, this report provides a qualitative comparative analysis of two 
prominent cases of water remunicipalisation in Europe: Paris, France (water supply, 2010 to present); 
and Berlin, Germany (water supply and sanitation, 2013 to present).  
  
Both cases look at the experience of water privatisation and subsequent remunicipalisation and the 
implications for sustainable water development. The objective is to identify similarities and 
differences between institutional trajectories characterised by the policy process and outcome of 
water remunicipalisation. The aim is to equip policy participants with evidence to inform decisions on 
remunicipalisation, at a time when privatisation is becoming increasingly controversial. The following 
section sets out key definitions and models of privatisation, the analytical framework and case study 
selection. Section 3 reviews the two case studies. Section 4 discusses the findings of the report, which 
ends with concluding remarks and recommendations in section 5.      
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Analytical Framework 
Assessing the comparative advantages of remunicipalisation and privatisation in terms of fostering 
sustainable water development or other policy goals of service provision involves three steps. Firstly 
differentiating between models of provision, secondly defining sustainable water development and 
other policy goals of service provision, and thirdly providing a basis for the evaluation of comparative 
advantage. We first develop the analytical framework around these three dimensions to understand 
how changes in governance may affect the more or less sustainable trajectories of urban water 
services. This framework supports an analysis of whether the governance of remunicipalised water 
services has better prospects of enhancing sustainable water development than the governance of 
privatised water services. The rationale for case study selection is then elaborated and the format of 
the case studies is indicated.  
 
Models of provision 
To differentiate between models of provision, the report first defines water privatisation and 
remunicipalisation. It then proceeds by differentiating between types of remunicipalisation in light of 
the degree of rupture or continuity with the practices of privatised operations.  
 
Water privatisation vs. remunicipalisation 
Water privatisation is defined as the transfer to private companies of the right to streams of income 
generated from water service provision. This definition – according to which water privatisation 
encompasses outright divestiture as well as concessions, lease contracts and other PPPs - is consistent 
with that adopted by the World Bank in an influential study and is commonly used in the USA, the UK 
and elsewhere.12 This definition is based on the transfer of rights to operational income irrespective 
of the extent to which the private sector owns shares in a water utility. It helps clarify that, as 
acknowledged by leading mainstream economists,13 all private companies pursue profit maximisation 
as their raison d’être. Therefore, the notion of water privatisation includes a variety of arrangements 
for the delivery of water services. Under outright divestiture the private sector owns the 
infrastructure, has the responsibility to provide for all operating and capital expenditure, and holds 
the right to appropriate all net gains. Under concession contracts, the private sector does not own the 
infrastructure but has the responsibility to provide for all operating and capital expenditure and holds 
the right to appropriate all net gains. Under lease contracts, the private sector does not own the 
infrastructure, nor does it have the responsibility to provide capital expenditure, but has the 
responsibility to provide for all operating expenditure and holds the right to appropriate the 
corresponding net gains. Under management contracts, the private sector has the sole responsibility 
to manage the utility and is remunerated on a fix basis or in a form aimed at providing performance 
incentives. In addition, it is possible to find hybrids between these contractual arrangements.14 
Delegation has underpinned the French model of privatisation and had most international influence, 
whereas the UK has been home to the English model of water privatisation by divestiture.15  
 
Water remunicipalisation has been defined as a form of reverse privatisation.16 In other words, 
remunicipalisation implies an end to privatisation and the return to full public ownership and control 
of a water utility, including its strategic and day-to-day management, subject to democratic 
governance. This means that the utility’s decisions are ultimately subject to the approval and oversight 
of democratically elected representatives, complemented where applicable by participatory decision 
making.17 Democratic governance can, however, be exercised in different ways. While corporate 
governance in private enterprises is dictated by the profit maximisation imperative, under public 
ownership there is no such imperative.18 The behaviour of public enterprises may be influenced by 
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traditional public sector values like political accountability, regime stability, transparency and social 
cohesion or, conversely, by the pursuit of commercial objectives.19 There is, therefore, a need to 
differentiate between types of remunicipalisation. 
 
Transformative vs. progressive remunicipalisation            
The debate on the nature of remunicipalisation has identified two distinct institutional trajectories of 
remunicipalisation. On the one hand, transformative remunicipalisation marks a clear rupture with 
the governance and practice of privatisation. By inverting the priorities of water service provision from 
the pursuit of private gain to that of collective development, transformative remunicipalisation 
becomes an emancipatory economic, political and social project aimed at subverting neoliberal 
models of urban governance.20 On the other hand, progressive remunicipalisation shows a greater 
degree of continuity with the governance and practice of privatisation, once that exception is made 
for the change from private to public ownership. Despite ownership change, progressive 
remunicipalisation is marked by incremental adjustments of the governance and practice of water 
service provision. As a result, New Public Management practices like the pursuit of profit are adapted 
to and continued under public ownership. By retaining a commercial orientation, progressive 
remunicipalisation contributes to reproduce New Public Management regimes in local government. 
Yet, gradual institutional changes that mitigate the extraction of net gains may result in incremental 
improvements in service delivery outcomes.21     
 
Policy goals of water service provision 
Sustainable water development 
To define sustainable water development, the report adapts the World Commission on Environment 
and Development’s definition of sustainability as “development that meets the needs of the present 
without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs”.22 Sustainable water 
development can therefore be defined as development that enables the reproduction and viability of 
water services while fostering the flourishing of human communities, in the short as well as in the long 
term. A comprehensive understanding of sustainable water development requires identifying the in-
terdependencies between multilevel factors including financial, economic, technical, social, environ-
mental and political factors. 
 
Financial viability is the capacity of a water utility to finance the required operating and capital 
expenditure, whether through tariffs or other means. Economic sustainability depends among other 
things on the ability of a water utility to provide consumers with publicly acceptable value for money 
and maintain whole asset value. Technical sustainability consists in the ability of a water utility to 
maintain, renew and expand infrastructure and to upgrade operational systems so as to deliver quality 
services in the long-term. This can, for example, be measured in terms of leakage or customer 
satisfaction. Social sustainability pertains to the ability of a water utility to ensure the reproduction 
and viability of water services while enhancing social cohesion and inclusivity and expanding access to 
affordable water and sewerage. Environmental sustainability requires that water services are 
delivered in a way that prevents or minimises harm to the environment. Political sustainability 
comprises the ability of a system of internal or external governance to underpin the political and 
societal consensus that supports the viable and sustainable reproduction of that governance system. 
As an example of the complex interdependencies between these factors, it is possible to observe that 
leakage reduction is not only instrumental to the maintenance of infrastructure, but also to the 
financial viability of a water utility and the reduction of its environmental impact.23 Also, labour does 
at the same time constitute an important part of a water utility’s operational costs, fulfils an essential 
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role in the reproduction of organisational capabilities, contributes to the sustenance of communities, 
and is a policy participant through social dialogue and social mobilisation.24 
 
The human right to water 
Defined as the right of everyone to sufficient, safe, acceptable, accessible and affordable water for 
personal and domestic uses, the human right to water is underpinned by principles whose joint 
fulfilment is conducive to emancipatory outcomes: availability, quality and safety, cultural 
acceptability, accessibility, affordability, equality, non-discrimination, access to information and 
transparency, participation, accountability and sustainability. Also, states have obligations to use the 
maximum available resources for the progressive realisation of the right to water and to avoid 
retrogression in the enjoyment of the right.25 
 
The realisation of the human right to water and the achievement of sustainable water development 
are therefore intertwined. While sustainability is one of the principles that underpin efforts to realise 
the human right to water, the realisation of this right is integral to the social component of sustainable 
water development as defined above.  
 
Comparative advantage and institutional trajectories 
The achievement of sustainable water development and the realisation of the human right to water 
involve assessing the comparative advantage of transformative remunicipalisation, progressive 
remunicipalisation and privatisation, as well as their respective governance. This comparative 
assessment must be premised on an evidence-based and sound methodological approach26 rather 
than ideology. An example of a flawed assumption of the necessity and inevitability of policy change 
is the World Bank’s pronouncement that ‘there is no alternative’ to water privatisation.27 The two case 
studies reviewed in this report question  such an assumption. This report offers an in-depth analysis 
of the impact that different models of provision have on sustainable water development and the 
human right to water.28 This impact translates into the trajectories of different governance systems, 
as these trajectories may support or undermine the achievement of the policy goals of water service 
provision.29 In sum, our methodological approach to assessing the comparative advantages of 
remunicipalisation and privatisation in a range of settings is historical because based on the 
observation of real-world experience, rather than being ideological or abstract.      
 
The two prominent cases of remunicipalisation have been selected because of the opportunities they 
offer for policy learning. Both cases represent major European cities that, having experimented with 
different forms of water privatisation, have remunicipalised for several years and therefore enable a 
longer-term assessment of the outcome of remunicipalisation. The two cases allow for identifying 
some of the possible institutional trajectories of remunicipalisation and the factors that may influence 
the evolution of such trajectories. Each case study begins with a summary, followed by a brief 
technological and historical background to water service reform in the city. They go on to review the 
experience of privatisation, the rationale for the decision to remunicipalise, and the implementation 
process before detailing the outcomes of remunicipalisation and explaining how results were achieved 
and challenges overcome or otherwise met. In the discussion of findings lessons are drawn on the 
limitations and potentials of remunicipalised and privatised services in pursuit of the policy goals of 
water service provision. These lessons are identified through the comparative analysis of the case 
studies. This approach allows for the identification of policy implications relevant for the debate on 
whether and how to remunicipalise water services.                
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Transformative water remunicipalisation in Paris, France 
Case study written by Emanuele Lobina 
 
Case study summary 
The remunicipalisation of water in Paris demonstrates the transformative power of public ownership 
when this is guided by political will to achieve progressive objectives. Remunicipalisation has radically 
changed water governance, prioritising the human right to water and sustainable development over 
profit maximisation. It has led to efficiency savings and reduced water tariffs, high investment levels, 
improved access to water, interventions for the environment, and strong democratic governance.       
 
Introduction 
The remunicipalisation of water supply on 1st January 2010 interrupted 25 years of private water 
management in Paris (population of 2.2 million)30 and gained symbolic power in the eyes of local 
authorities in France and beyond. Not only because Paris is the capital city of France, the homeland of 
the globally dominant model of water privatisation. But also because the two major water 
multinationals – Veolia and Suez – have their headquarters in Paris and their subsidiaries had supplied 
water to the city’s dwellers until their contracts expired in December 2009 and were not renewed.31 
The effect of this symbolic event has been to accelerate the international diffusion of water 
remunicipalisation. The number of remunicipalisation cases in France has trebled in the five years 
following the remunicipalisation of Paris compared to the previous ten years (with 63 cases from 2010 
to early 2015), and doubled in high-income countries compared to the previous five years (with 104 
cases from 2010 to early 2015).32    
 
If the achievements of Paris’s new public water operator demonstrate the transformative potential of 
remunicipalisation, the rationale for the decision to end the city’s experience with water privatisation 
is also of high relevance for decision makers. The reasons that induced the city of Paris to 
remunicipalise water supply include price hikes not justified by the investments made by private 
operators, lack of financial transparency under private management, difficulties in achieving 
sustainable development objectives through the renegotiation of private contracts, and the greater 
degree of public control and managerial flexibility that come with public ownership. These reasons 
are common determinants of water remunicipalisation across countries,33 but they also reflect the 
experience of many more local governments that unsuccessfully attempt to renegotiate private 
contracts or remunicipalise water services.34    
 
Technical and historical background 
In the last two centuries, the reform process of Paris’s water supply has been varied and complex. In 
the mid- 19th century, water supply was entrusted to an administrative department of the prefecture 
with the exception of billing which in 1860 was outsourced to Générale des Eaux (that would later 
become Veolia) with the award of a 50-year contract. This continued to be the case after the municipal 
government of Paris was established in 1975. In fact, a new 60-year contract for billing and metering 
was signed with Générale des Eaux in 1924 and it was only in 1981 that the management of water 
supply was handed over to an administrative department of the City of Paris. In 1984, when the 
contract with Générale des Eaux was due to expire, Gaullist mayor Jacques Chirac decided to privatise 
the entire water supply service.35  
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A number of explanations have been offered for the 1984 decision to privatise water. The City of Paris 
justified its decision in light of the investments required to reduce leakage after years of neglect.36 
This justification rested on the results of a technical study conducted by a private consultancy,37 which 
found that the pipeline network was in poor conditions due to the public undertaking’s decision to 
privilege the production of greater volumes of water over the maintenance of the network.38 The 
situation was compounded by the fact that the income generated by the water service was used to 
fund the budget of the municipal government; another frequent reason for the privatisation of water 
in France.39 Several observers have, however, pointed to the political and personal connections 
between Chirac and Lyonnaise des Eaux executive Jérôme Monod as a reason for the decision to 
privatise the city’s water supply service.40 Others have also argued that the decision was a response 
to a workers’ strike.41 This was not unusual at that time, as a number of French mayors decided to 
privatise water services as an anti-trade union measure.42          
 
Experience with privatisation 
Governance 
The City of Paris awarded two 25-year lease contracts, starting from 1st January 1985, respectively to 
Générale des Eaux for the right bank of the river Seine and Lyonnaise des Eaux (which would then 
become Suez) for the left bank. The two companies agreed that Générale des Eaux would continue to 
provide billing and metering for the entire city, acting as a subcontractor for Lyonnaise des Eaux in the 
left bank. Bulk water supply (including the abstraction, treatment and transportation of water) was 
delegated to the public-private joint venture SAGEP with the award of a 25-year concession contract 
on 31st January 1987. SAGEP was 72% owned by the City of Paris, 14% owned by Générale des Eaux 
and 14% owned by Lyonnaise des Eaux. In addition to bulk water supply, SAGEP was responsible for 
controlling the two private water supply operators on behalf of the city council.43      
 
The rationale for awarding two separate lease contracts was that of stimulating competition between 
the two private operators as their performance would thus be subject to a comparative evaluation.44 
However, the following limitations of the governance arrangements undermined that rationale. First, 
there was no competition for the market – the most diffuse form of competition in the water sector 
– because the two lease contracts were awarded without any call for tender.45 Second, there was a 
lack of accountability due to the fact that the two private operators were – as a result of their joint 
ownership of SAGEP – at the same time regulator and regulated.46 Third, the conflict of interest of the 
two private companies was compounded by the fact that their subsidiaries could take advantage of 
insider information when bidding for the works and supply contracts tendered by SAGEP.47  
 
Price hikes 
Over the lifetime of the two lease contracts, from 1985 to 2009, the price of water in Paris increased 
by 174%, excluding taxes, corresponding to an annual increase of 6.95%. Not only did such a price 
increase outstrip inflation. Also, it was not justified by the investments made in that period.48  
 
Private profits 
The lack of financial transparency and accountability and the excessive profits of the two private com-
panies were criticised in a number of audits and reports. In a letter sent to the mayor of Paris in Sep-
tember 2000 the regional office of France’s national audit body emphasised the lack of financial trans-
parency characterising the Parisian operations of Générale des Eaux. The letter pointed to the opacity 
of the accounts which failed to disclose in full the financial results of water supply operations on the 
right bank of the river. In November 2002, the consultancy Service Public 2000 – which had been set 
up by the Association of French Mayors (AMF) and the French association of conceding authorities 
and public enterprises (FNCCR) to provide technical support to local authorities in the regulation of 
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private contractors49 - found that the price charged by the two private operators in Paris was 25% to 
30% higher than what was economically justified. In December 2003, a report by France’s national 
audit body noted that there was a growing difference between the amount paid by consumers to-
wards the constitution of provisions for infrastructure renewal – reserves aimed at guaranteeing the 
financing of renewal works – and the amount of works carried out for this purpose. While the effect 
of this practice was to inflate prices, the accounts of the two private operators grossly underestimated 
their profit margins. One mechanism used to underestimate the profits made by the two private op-
erators was the subcontracting of works contracts to their own subsidiaries without calling for ten-
ders. This practice enabled these subsidiaries to increase the remuneration of the respective mother 
companies, while the accounts of the two operators recorded a reduction in profits due to the costs 
of subcontracting.50 The estimation of actual profits was made particularly difficult by the private com-
panies’ reluctance to provide accurate and complete financial data, despite repeated requests.51     
 
Contractual renegotiation 
The above revelations motivated the new Socialist mayor of Paris, Bertrand Delanoë, to renegotiate 
the contracts with the private companies to strengthen transparency and accountability. After months 
of negotiation, in December 2003 the responsibility to control the execution of the lease contracts 
and the procurement process was transferred from SAGEP to the City of Paris. For the first time since 
the award of the two lease contracts, an obligation was placed on the private companies to produce 
a maintenance plan and annual financial reports. The companies were also expected to pay duties for 
the occupation of public soil and the use of the pipeline network which had been previously paid by 
SAGEP and which would amount to €28 million for the remaining duration of the contracts. Despite 
these improvements, the two companies retained the right to subcontract works to their subsidiaries 
without having to call for tender – a practice which enabled them to inflate the price of works by up 
to 20%. Also, they could retain the renewal provisions that remained unspent at the end of the con-
tract and treat them as profits, and this remained the case until French law changed in 2006. Finally, 
the accounts submitted by the companies would still follow the guidelines of the association of private 
service provider, thus falling short of the highest standards in terms of financial transparency. The 
upshot was that, although strengthened, the control of the municipal administration over the opera-
tions and finances of the lease contracts remained unsatisfactory.52 
 
Remunicipalisation process 
The decision to remunicipalise 
The political decision to remunicipalise water supply was made after a long deliberative process. In 
2006, there was an internal consultation with the management and staff of SAGEP. In parallel, SAGEP 
conducted a study on the end of the two lease contracts and of SAGEP’s own concession. A compara-
tive study was conducted on French and European experiences with the organisation of water ser-
vices. Also, a two year long comparative analysis of the possible organisational arrangements was car-
ried out, with an emphasis on the relative merits of two scenarios: a) public management of bulk water 
supply and private management of water distribution under a single lease contract; and b) public man-
agement of an integrated water supply system, bringing together bulk supply and distribution. The 
study showed that while the first scenario would imply a smoother transition followed by long-term 
difficulties with the regulation of the private operator, the second scenario would imply a more diffi-
cult transition followed by a less problematic principal-agent relationship in the long term. The results 
of the studies were also subject to consultation with the Parisian Water Observatory, a forum for pub-
lic participation set up by the City of Paris. Comforted by the results of these studies and consultations, 
the mayor announced that – if re-elected in March 2008 – his administration would have remunicipal-
ised water supply. The mayor was re-elected and in November 2008 the city council decided not to 
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renew the two lease contracts that were due to expire in December 2009, and to transfer the respon-
sibilities for both bulk water supply and water distribution to a unique public water operator.53    
 
The restructuring of the public-private concessionaire 
In March 2007, the city council voted to instruct Veolia and Suez to sell their shares in SAGEP to the 
state-owned financial institution Caisse des Dépôts et Consignations, as a first step towards the remu-
nicipalisation of bulk water supply. The sale of the private shares enabled the City of Paris to restruc-
ture SAGEP into a régie à autonomie financière et personnalité morale, an agency of the municipal 
government wholly-owned by the City and enjoying financial autonomy and distinct legal character. 
This form of public enterprise was chosen because it allowed for management flexibility together with 
public control and because it enabled the transfer of staff from the two private operators, which was 
governed by private law, to the new régie. On 1st January 2009, SAGEP was transformed into the new 
régie Eau de Paris which started to manage bulk water supply in June 2009. Also in 2009, the activities 
of the public laboratory for the control of water quality and for research and development CRECEP 
were transferred to Eau de Paris. On 1st January 2010, the day after the expiry of the two lease con-
tracts, the staff of the two private water operators was transferred to Eau de Paris and this started to 
manage both bulk water supply and water distribution.54    
 
Difficulties with the transition from private to public management 
As predicted by the preparatory studies, the transition from private to public management proved 
difficult. In particular, there have been difficulties in three areas: the harmonisation of employment 
conditions for the former employees of the private operators; the incompatibility of IT systems for 
management, metering and billing; and, the passage from private to public accounting. After tense 
negotiations with trade unions, the harmonisation of pay and working conditions for all workers has 
led to a yearly salary increases of 1.5% to 2.5% over and above the 2% increase indicated in the service 
contract with the City. On the other hand, not all the employees of the two private operators were 
transferred to the new régie on 1st January 2010, leading to a loss of local knowledge particularly on 
the operation of IT systems. Other transitional difficulties included the incompatibility of IT systems 
used by the two private operators for management, metering and billing, which could only be oper-
ated by the two private operators and which forced Eau de Paris to outsource these ancillary services 
to Veolia and Suez in order to ensure service continuity. Finally, the need to familiarise with a new 
public accounting system has led to delays in the payment of suppliers that have resulted in penalties 
until 2014. In 2017, a report of France’s Regional Court of Auditors observed that Eau de Paris had 




The regulatory relationship between the City of Paris and Eau de Paris is governed by a 6-year service 
contract that sets objectives inspired by the principles of the human right to water and sustainable 
development. These objectives include guaranteeing access to water, ensuring efficient and effective 
operations, and investing for the long-term development of the water system.56 Transparency, 
accountability and public participation in decision-making have been considerably strengthened 
compared to private governance arrangements in place until 2009. As of February 2019, the Board of 
Directors of Eau de Paris was composed of 18 members entitled to vote – of which, 13 city councillors, 
two workers’ representatives, and three civil society representatives. In addition, two experts sat as 
observers or consultative members of the Board of Directors.57 Another participatory mechanism is 
represented by the Parisian Water Observatory, a forum open to all stakeholders that aims to serve 
as a critical friend to the City and Eau de Paris in relation to the formulation and implementation of 
water policy.58 In June 2017, on occasion of Public Services day, Eau de Paris was awarded the United 
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Nations Public Service Award. This award, which aims at rewarding excellence in the public sector, 
was given in recognition of Eau de Paris’s "efforts to promote transparency, accountability and 
integrity in public service".59 
 
Efficiency savings  
In the first year of operations the new public municipal operator Eau de Paris made efficiency savings 
of €35 million, which enabled the public enterprise to reduce tariffs by 8% in July 2011. These effi-
ciency savings were made despite the transitional difficulties experienced by the new régie and thanks 
to a number of factors that distinguish public from private operations: a) the fact that public enter-
prises are not subject to paying corporate tax; b) the fact that Eau de Paris does not pay dividends to 
shareholders and that all profits made by Eau de Paris are reinvested in the development of the sys-
tem; c) the fact that Eau de Paris is subject to public procurement rules and that competitive tenders 
are called for all works and supply contracts; and, d) the rationalisation and economies of scale and 
scope that come with the integration of bulk water supply and water distribution services.60 In the 
following years, there have been minor adjustments in the price of water so that the overall price 
reduction from 2010 to 2017 has been of 2.6%.61 This is not insignificant, considering that the trans-
action costs of remunicipalisation exceeded €30 million62 and that, due to decreasing water consump-
tion, the sales of Eau de Paris have fallen by 10.4% in the period 2010-2015.63 Indeed, this 2.6% price 
reduction from 2010 to 2017 under public management contrasts with a 174% tariff increase under 
private operation from 1985 to 2009.64 
 
Self-financing  
Eau de Paris enjoys a low level of indebtedness and a high level of self-financing, that is the capacity 
to finance investments using the revenues of the enterprise. If Eau de Paris’ total indebtedness 
amounted to €77 million in 2011, this had decreased to €66 million in 2015.65 In 2018, Eau de Paris 
was in a position to extinguish all its debts in less than one year, much faster than its own objective of 
less than 7 years. The average self-financing ratio for the period 2017-2018 was around 100%, which 
is an indicator of strong financial sustainability.66    
 
Investment levels  
The operational performance of Eau de Paris initially suffered because of the difficulties experienced 
with the transition from private to public management,67 notably due to a 30% increase in operating 
costs between 2010 and 2015.68 Once these difficulties were overcome, Eau de Paris managed to 
achieve high investment levels that kept increasing throughout the years. From 2010 to 2017, Eau de 
Paris invested an aggregate €543.28 million for a yearly average of €67.91 million69. From 2015 to 
2018, the yearly average of investments carried out by Eau de Paris was even higher, at €76.8 million.70   
 
Infrastructure renewal  
Eau de Paris has continuously improved its performance in terms of infrastructure renewal, an area of 
performance which is important for the sustainable development of ageing water systems like that of 
Paris. While in 2010 the rate of water pipeline renewal was 0.13%, this indicator grew to 0.25% in 
201371 and 0.85% in 2018.72 It should be noted that the rate of renewal achieved by Eau de Paris in 
2018 is in line with the highest international standards.73     
 
Leakage 
Due to a number of reasons – which include the ageing and thus inaccuracy of many meters, as well 
as the interruption in 2014 of interventions to detect leakage, due to the discovery of asbestos in the 
pipes – leakage ratios have fluctuated from around 8% between 2010 and 2013 to around 10% be-
tween 2015 and 2018. The introduction of acoustic sensing techniques in late 2017 has enabled to 
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significantly increase the number of leaks detected.74 The introduction of meter renewal programme 
in 2019 is expected to improve leakage ratios further.75 These figures require some context. First, Eau 
de Paris has adopted a more stringent method for calculating leaks since beginning operations, so that 
the comparison of leakage with the previous private operations has been complicated.76 Second, a 
leakage ratio of 10% is very good by international standards77 and, for example, amounts to half the 
national average in both France and England.78    
 
Customer services  
In July 2011, Eau de Paris in-sourced customers services launching a range of free services offering 
real-time information to consumers, including alerts on leaks and over-consumption. These services 
are, together with a single entry-point online centre for answering customers’ queries, behind a high 
customer satisfaction rate ranging between 96% and 90% in the period 2012-2018, and the award to 
Eau de Paris of the Best Customer Service of the Year prize for 7 consecutive years.79    
 
Access to water  
Eau de Paris has made important interventions to improve access to water. In 2010, it has increased 
its contribution to the Housing Solidarity Fund – a fund aimed at supporting vulnerable consumers in 
difficulty with the payment of water bills – to €250,000 (the aggregate annual contribution previously 
made by the two private water operators was €175,000). Eau de Paris then doubled its contribution 
to €500,000 and kept donating the same amount since then.80 In other words, Eau de Paris nearly 
trebled the financial resources devoted to improving affordability and access for vulnerable consum-
ers, relative to the contributions of the two private operators. In 2012, it established a new fund aimed 
at helping individual customers. Its policy forbids disconnecting consumers for non-payment, even in 
squats. It has improved on-street access to water by operating a network of free-access fountains and 
providing homeless people with water by distributing flasks and jerrycans along with maps of water 
access points.81 In an effort to facilitate the access to water for all, including the homeless, Eau de 
Paris has helped the City of Paris to increase the number of free-access fountains available to the 
public from 127 in 2010 to 196 in 2018, of which 87 kept functioning in sub-zero temperatures. The 
construction of these fountains is financed by the municipal government and Eau de Paris is responsi-
ble for their operation and maintenance, which is financed through tariffs. The decision to construct 
the new fountains has been made as part of the city’s participatory budgeting. Since January 2018, 
the City of Paris has given Eau de Paris the responsibility to operate and manage 919 free-access water 
fountains in the city’s parks and green areas.82   
 
Interventions for the environment  
Eau de Paris has undertaken a program of acquisition of agricultural land to prevent the use of pesti-
cides and other substances that may pollute groundwater. Since 2010, this activity has intensified com-
pared to the practice of SAGEP under mixed ownership. Eau de Paris also enters into partnerships with 
farmers to ensure that their lands are devoted to pasture or that they use sustainable growing prac-
tices. These interventions have a positive environmental impact and reduce the cost of treating water.83  
 
In 2016, Eau de Paris achieved a 12% reduction in the consumption of electricity and a 15% reduction 
in greenhouse gas emissions relative to 2004. Also in 2016, 95% of the electricity it consumed was of 
renewable origin. Finally, Eau de Paris set up a geothermal power plant that uses groundwater heat to 
produce 75% of the energy needed by a Parisian district.84   
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Sustainability 
Water remunicipalisation in Paris has fostered sustainable water development at the financial, 
economic, technical, political, social and environmental levels. It has produced transformative results 
at various levels thanks to a policy that has placed the interests of consumers, the environment and 
the local community before technical and commercial considerations.   
Financial sustainability 
Remunicipalisation has enabled Eau de Paris to enjoy low indebtedness and high self-financing ratios, 
and to achieve high investment levels.  
Economic sustainability 
Eau de Paris has increased efficiency and reduced prices, inverting the 25-year trend of above inflation 
price increases under private management.  
Technical sustainability 
Despite transitional difficulties with the integration of IT systems, Eau de Paris has achieved levels of 
excellence for customer satisfaction, low leakage levels and a high rate of pipeline renewal.  
Political sustainability 
Eau de Paris’s strong democratic governance and a variety of mechanisms promoting transparency, 
accountability and integrity, have attracted international recognition.    
Social sustainability 
Inspired by the principle of the human right to water, Eau de Paris has multiplied efforts to guarantee 
access to water compared to those of the preceding private operators. Eau de Paris’ efforts include 
the reduction of prices, payment of subsidies to a solidarity fund, and operation of a growing network 
of public fountains.    
Environmental sustainability 
Inspired by the principle of sustainable development, Eau de Paris has intensified efforts to prevent 
groundwater pollution and reduce the need for water treatment. It has also produced important 
efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions in the city of Paris. 
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Progressive remunicipalisation in Berlin, Germany 
Case study written by Vera Weghmann, Emanuele Lobina and Katrin Nicke 
 
Case study summary 
The case of Berlin (population of 3.8 million)85 shows that remunicipalisation is not always 
transformative. However, even moderate changes in governance can lead to progress towards the 
realisation of the human right to water and enhancement of sustainable water development, 
compared to what is the case under privatisation. Remunicipalisation in Berlin has facilitated the 
implementation of price cuts imposed by a federal regulator and supported the City’s decision to 
enhance the realisation of the human right to water, although investment levels remain similar to 
those under privatisation.  
 
Introduction 
Reunification costs were stretching Berlin’s budget in the 1990s. In line with the neoliberal consensus 
of the time, privatisation was the quick and easy answer for both financial recovery and the provision 
of restructured public services within financial constraints. After privatising other public services Berlin 
began the process to privatise its water services in the mid-1990s.86  
 
On the 29th of October 1999 Berlin signed 30-year contracts for the privatisation of Berliner Wasser 
Betriebe (BWB), Berlin’s water and sewage utility, with RWE and Vivendi (now Veolia) also buying 
49.9% of BWB for €1.8 billion and receiving a share of 24.95% each.87 The privatisation turned out to 
be highly controversial. The explosion of water prices after 2004 from 2003 to 2006 led to public 
resistance, which eventually led to the remunicipalisation of Berlin’s water services in 2013.  
 
Technical and historical background 
Preparations for the privatization of BWB began with its commercialisation in 1994 when the Senate 
of the city-state of Berlin decided to restructure the public company.88 This was done in order to help 
pay off the city’s debts and turn the BWB into a profit making company by operating international 
contracts,89 for example buying shares of Budapest Sewage Works in 1997. This process was facilitated 
by the “Berliner Betriebegesetz” that, adopted in 1994, promoted greater independence in the 
management of public enterprises through a reduction in political influence and control. The BWB 
developed a broad portfolio with more than 20 partnerships, many of which proved to be unprofitable 
and represented expensive, unsuccessful investments for the BWB and thus also for its guarantor the 
city of Berlin. Yet even though the failures became obvious, Berlin’s government did not interfere, for 
instance, by reducing BWB’s operations back to its core business and generating a moderate revenue 
for Berlin’s budget.90 Further, the senate decided to privatise the BWB by selling part of its capital to 
the private sector. Following the full privatizations of its energy companies (Bewag and Gasag) in 1997 
and 1998, the BWB was the only public entity left that could be privatised to meet budget deficits. 
This decision was presented as ‘a necessity in the face of rising city debts’ and as an opportunity to 
make BWB an important commercial player in the global water market.91 Most political parties in the 
Senate accepted the privatisation of the BWB as inevitable.92 In 1999 the consortium 
Vivendi/RWE/Allianz were awarded to take over 49.9% of the shares of BWB. The purchase price 
amounted to 3.1 billion Deutsche Mark (approximately 1.7 billion Euro) and was the highest offer. The 
contract validity was 30 years.93  
 
Trade unions and labour 
The workers of Berlin’s waterworks, Berliner Wasser Betriebe (BWB), with the support of their trade 
union, the Public Services Union (ÖTV), which later merged and was renamed ver.di, contested the 
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water privatisation plans. First the union proposed an alternative solution that would fulfil the senate’s 
expectation to generate DM 2 billion (€ 1.06 billion) in revenues. The union proposal was very quickly 
rejected by the Senate, probably the most visible sign that the Senate’s goal had always been BWB 
privatization in itself, not generation of funds to balance the city budget (the official narrative). The 
ÖTV then demanded that in case of privatization, management control had to remain independent of 
external (non-Berlin) water utilities, but this was also rejected.94 However, union resistance led to a 
strong collective agreement, which meant that the pay and working conditions remained the same 
after the privatisation and the employees had their employment guaranteed until 2014, in other 
words no involuntary redundancies could be made.95 Unlike other cases of privatisation the BWB did 
not hire new employees on different contracts when employees left voluntarily or retired leading to 
a two tier workforce96 
 
Experience with privatisation 
Governance 
The contract - called the consortium agreement - between the private companies and Berlin, was a 
key governance mechanism in the privatised BWB. The consortium agreement outlined a) the shared 
aims of the contract partners b) the business structure c) the appointment of management, d) the 
objectives of the cooperation and arrangements for interruptions, placement of the stock, contract 
questions of guarantee, merger control and implementation. All other contracts and agreements were 
annexes to the consortium agreement.97 The consortium agreement  also agreed that: i) within 10 
years 2.5 billion Euro, equivalent to about 250 million Euro per year, must be used for investment;98 
ii) the tariffs would remain stable until 2003; and, iii) enforced redundancies were excluded until 2014. 
Significantly the consortium agreement included a guaranteed return on equity for the private 
companies. This varied on a yearly basis, as it amounted to the sum of the average of German 
government bond yields and a premium of 2%, and in some years totalled around 8%.99 If the tariffs 
could not be increased by the Senate, the profits for the investors were guaranteed by the State 
budget.100 Most notably for transparency, the contracts remained confidential and were not available 
to the public.101 Not even the Parliament was able to view the full contract.102  
 
Price hikes 
The BWB financed itself exclusively from tariffs.103 As mentioned above the consortium agreement 
meant that until 2003 it was agreed that water charges to the consumer tariffs would remain stable. 
However, immediately after 2003 the tariffs increased drastically. Between 2003 and 2006 alone 
water prices rose by nearly 24%.104  
 
Private profits 
The private investors made good business in Berlin. Between 2001 and 2011 the private shareholders 
received a profit transfer at a total of 1,142.6 million Euro. This means that just within 10 years they 
recovered 67.21% of the capital they used to buy their shares in 1999 (which was about 1.7billion 
Euro). At the same time the city of Berlin received only 778.1 million Euro because Berlin has 
renounced about 365 million Euro of the profits it was entitled to receive during this period.105 The 
unequal distribution of dividends between the private and public shareholders was due to the fact 
that in 1999 the Berlin Constitutional Court had ruled that the formula for the calculation of return on 
equity was unconstitutional, effectively lowering the return on equity. Because the City of Berlin was 
contractually committed to guarantee the remuneration of the private shareholders, it agreed to 
waive its claim to part of 50.1% of profits to compensate the private shareholders for the loss suffered 
as a result of the 1999 ruling. In 2003, a new tariff formula was introduced which resulted in consistent 
price increases, thus explaining the explosion of tariffs from 2003 to 2006.106        
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The drastic rise in water charges led to political opposition as well as a more pragmatic recognition of 
policy and regulatory failure. Consequently, re-regulation efforts were made. In 2006 new rules for 
the Berliner Betriebegesetz (the Berlin company law) were agreed that would increase governmental 
and parliamentary oversight of public companies.107 A year later, in 2007, an amendment of the 
freedom of information act and a court decision of the Higher Administrative Court Berlin-
Brandenburg (OVG), ruled  that the general basis of the calculation of the water and wastewater 
disposal tariffs had to be publicly available. 108 These new regulations can be seen as the first challenge 
to the confidential arrangements that guaranteed the profits of the private companies and 
underpinned higher prices.  
 
Social mobilisation 
The rising water prices and the opaque contracts with the private providers caused public anger and 
the privatization of water became a topical issue in Berlin. In that context, the anti-privatization 
movement Attac initiated a campaign for the remunicipalisation of water. In May 2006, the Berliner 
Wassertisch (water table) was launched, a grass roots campaign to take Berlin’s water back under 
public ownership. Interestingly rather than demanding direct remunicipalisation it first demanded 
transparency. 
 
The initial demands of the Wassertisch was that the confidential contracts of the privatisation deal 
would be made public and there would be clarity on how the water tariffs were calculated and how 
much profits the private companies, REW and Veolia, were making from the water services in Berlin. 
The campaign mobilised a petition (Volksbegehren) demanding full transparency on the consortium 
agreement. According to German law if a Volksbegehren has collected the signatures of 7% of those 
eligible to vote within four months, the city is obliged to hold a referendum (Volksentscheid).109 Within 
a few months 660,000 signatures were collected, well above the 170,000 needed to hold a 
referendum. One strategy of the Wassertisch was to use existing local community networks to recruit 
“signature collectors”, which produced the large number of signatures swiftly, but also raised public 
consciousness about the failure of privatized water110. The city of Berlin initiated a court case to 
preempt the Volksbegehren by arguing that the companies had a right to commercial confidentiality 
and that this had priority over the right of Berlin’s citizens to be informed. However, the Senate lost 
the court case and the Volksbegeheren was successful.  
 
In the run up to the referendum, October 2010, the left-wing Berlin newspaper, die Tageszeitung, 
published the confidential contracts.111 The referendum was held in February 2011 and 98.2% voted 
in favour of the proposition “Berliners want their water back”. Although, technically, the focus of the 
referendum was on ensuring the legal disclosure of all contracts, the Wassertisch had associated the 
referendum campaign with demands for the remunicipalisation of water services.112 The turn-out was 
27. 5% so just above the 25% needed to make the referendum valid. In total 666,235 Berliners voted 
for transparency and remunicipalisation - the first successful referendum in Berlin.113  
 
Corporate resistance 
In response to the referendum, Veolia and RWE filed a lawsuit in the constitutional court against the 
publication of the contract that had been required by the referendum. 114 However only a few months 
later RWE decided to withdraw from the water market to concentrate on energy and sold its shares 
in BWB in May 2012 to Berlin. In response, Veolia took RWE to court to prevent it from selling its 
shares to Berlin. 115  However, this was rejected by the provincial court in Berlin (Landgericht Berlin) 
116 and consequently Veolia started to negotiate with Berlin over remunicipalisation.  
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The transaction costs of remunicipalisation 
In 2012 Berlin brought back RWE’s 24.95% shares of the BWB, for €618 million. In December 2013 it 
brought back Veolia’s 24.95% for €590 million. The acquisition took effect retroactively from January 
2013. Through acquiring Veolia’s shares the BWB became 100% publicly owned;117  the total cost of 
remunicipalisation was €1.208 billion. The buy-backs are financed by a 30-year loan that will have to 
be repaid by water consumers.118 It should be noted, however, that these transaction costs of 
remunicipalisation should be primarily attributed to the 1999 privatisation.119 This is a helpful 
reminder that it is better not to privatise in the first place than having to remunicipalise in the (near) 




The Berlin Senate has continued to manage the remunicipalised BWB as a profit-oriented holding. For 
example, it has rejected the Berliner Wassertisch’s calls for introducing advanced forms of public 
participation and, instead, established a consultative consumer council much in line with the practice 
of private water operators whose preferred form of public participation is mere consultation.121 The 
Berliner Wassertisch opposed all this and launched a new demand “first remunicipalization - then 
democratization!” and drafted a “Berlin Water Charter” with concrete proposals for a transparent, 
socially fair and environmentally sustainable BWB in open consultation with Berlin’s population.122 
 
Nonetheless, the passage to full public ownership has removed the profit maximisation imperative 
that is characteristic of Public-Private Partnerships and other forms of privatisation. This has enabled 
BWB to reduce its rate of return to 5.1% as a way of financing the price cuts imposed by the Federal 
Cartel Office (see section below). By removing the profit maximisation imperative, remunicipalisation 
has also created the governance conditions for a less confrontational approach with the Federal Cartel 
Office, thus facilitating the reduction in prices. The significance of this approach to profit and price 
reduction should not be underestimated as multinational companies like Veolia have proved capable 
of resisting regulatory pressure, not only in developing but also in developed countries. More 
precisely, multinationals have often influenced local decision making processes by taking court cases 
or threatening litigation to obtain multimillion compensation. They have also taken extra-legal 
initiatives such as suspending the payment of concession fees and, in one case, even temporarily 
suspending service provision to exert pressure on local authorities. The result of these initiatives has 
often been to reverse regulatory decisions that negatively affected their commercial interests.123     
 
On the 22nd of March 2018, under the initiative of the Berliner Wassertisch, Berlin joined other cities 
across the world in becoming a ‘Blue Community’ following the introduction of the Canadian Blue 
Community project through the city’s Senate. 124 The declaration recognises water as a human right, 
pledges to keep the water services in public ownership and promotes the drinking of tap water over 
bottled water. Becoming a blue community Berlin signalled support for the international movement 
for public water ownership.125 It also led to the launch of a public investment programme for the 
construction of drinking water fountains to expand access to water. It remains to be seen, however, 
whether this development will lead to more transformative changes in governance. 
 
Regulation and efficiency savings  
Prior to the referendum and before the remunicipalisation the left-wing Senator Harald Wolf (Die 
Linke) called on the Bundeskartellamt (Germany’s Federal Cartel Office) in March 2010 to investigate 
Berlin’s water prices. He did this as the public concern for the rising water prices became more 
pressing. Harald Wolf’s initiative to get the cartel authorities involved reveals a lot about the 
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institutional set up of the BWB. Despite sitting on the board of managers that controlled the BWB 
Harald Wolf had no say in setting prices. When, in March 2011 the Federal Cartel Office suggested a 
price reduction of 16% the BWB appealed against the decision. However, the prospect of price 
reductions enforced by the cartel office made Berlin’s water sector much less attractive to private 
companies. The prospect of reduced profitability combined with the public pressure damaging the 
companies’ image is likely to have motivated RWE’s decision to sell its shares back to BWB. As 
mentioned above, Veolia was far less keen to sell and even unsuccessfully took RWE to court to 
prevent Berlin’s acquisition of RWE’s shares.  
 
Eventually, after the remunicipalisation, the cartel office and Berlin reached a settlement that tackled 
the excessive water prices. As a result, BWB had to reduce water prices by an average of 17% from 
2012. The price reduction corresponded to savings of more than €440 million for Berlin water users in 
the period between 2012 and 2018, as compared to 2011, demonstrating the extent to which water 
prices had been inflated by the privatised utility. In its investigations, the Federal Cartel Office 
compared water prices in Berlin with those in Hamburg, Munich and Cologne – where water is 
supplied by utilities operating under similar technical conditions to those in Berlin – and found that 
there was no justification for the high prices in Berlin.126  
 
Investment 
While agreed investment of 2.5 billion within 10 years was pledged during the part-privatisation, it 
has been argued that this was significantly less than necessary. By the time of the remunicipalisation 
Berlin’s water network suffered from  ‘severe under-investment’; the BWB estimated that 23% of the 
sewerage system was in need of rehabilitation measures, although at that point it had assessed only 
over half of the system.127 Consequently, the BWB committed to double the investment needed for 
the rehabilitation measures to €94 Million annually in the period from 2013-2020 – prior to 
remunicipalisation, only €47 Million had been spent on maintenance.128 However, there seems to be 
little improvement when comparing the amounts actually invested in the 5 years after 
remunicipalisation (2013-2017) with the investments made in the 5 years prior to remunicipalisation 
(2008-2012).129 
 
Access to water 
In May 2018, after becoming a “Blue Community”, the City of Berlin entered into an agreement with 
BWB for the installation of 100 free-access drinking water wells and water dispensers in 2018-2019, 
which the City was to finance to the tune of €1 million.130 It remains to be seen whether the City’s 
decision to become a “Blue Community” will lead to the prioritisation of expanding access to water 
over the commercial objectives of the publicly-owned BWB.  
 
Employment 
For the BWB’s workers the strong collective agreement they achieved through their struggle in the 
1990s remained valid. However, while there had been no redundancies under privatisation workers 
leaving had not been replaced. This led to a decrease of employment levels of nearly 35%, from 6012 
workers in 1999 to 4475 in 2010 (in full time equivalents).131 Following remunicipalisation, workers 
were reported to feel more secure in their jobs.132 
 
Sustainability 
In the case of Berlin, remunicipalisation has fostered sustainable water development at the economic, 
political and social levels. There is however continuity with the privatisation era, for example in the 
areas of financial and technical sustainability. 
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Financial sustainability 
Remunicipalisation has brought little change in terms of financial sustainability as the high costs of 
contract termination are limiting BWB’s capacity to finance investments above pre-2013 levels.  
Economic sustainability 
The remunicipalised BWB has, under regulatory pressure, increased efficiency and left investments 
stable compared to what happened under privatisation, providing better value for money and 
increasing whole asset value. 
Technical sustainability 
Investments have remained stable at pre-remunicipalisation levels as the costs of contract termination 
have been passed on to consumers, tariffs have been cut and dividends are still being paid to the City.   
Political sustainability 
It remains to be seen whether Berlin’s recognition as a “Blue City” will lead to a strengthening of 
democratic governance beyond declarations of intent.   
Social sustainability 
Remunicipalisation has induced BWB to cease the conflict with the Federal Cartel Office and to comply 
with its requests for a reduction in tariffs. BWB has also facilitated access to water by participating in 
a municipal programme for the construction of free-access water fountains. 
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Discussion of findings 
The analysis of these two prominent cases of water remunicipalisation – which implies both a 
comparative analysis of water remunicipalisation and privatisation, and of transformative and 
progressive remunicipalisation - reveals the following findings.  
 
Privatisation vs. sustainable water development/human right to water 
Our results provide additional evidence that privatisation is inimical to sustainable water development 
and the human right to water. This is so due to the rigidity of private water governance, which 
prioritises profit maximisation over and above economic, social and environmental considerations. 
This rigidity can be observed in dozens of other cases in high-income as well as low- and middle-
income countries, independently of the type of privatisation and form of regulation adopted.133  
 
Remunicipalisation debunks the myths of the public sector 
Whether transformative or progressive, the experience with remunicipalisation debunks the myths of 
the public sector that have contributed to the diffusion of water privatisation in the last 30 years. 
More precisely, the evidence on the policy process and policy outcome of remunicipalisation shows 
that, contrary to conventional wisdom: 
 
1. The public sector is not necessarily corrupt. Indeed, the evidence of remunicipalisation shows 
that the public sector is far more transparent, accountable and open to participatory 
governance than the private sector. As shown by the case of Berlin among others,134 
privatisation favours the secrecy of commercial confidentiality as a way of fostering profit-
maximisation. 
2. The public sector is not necessarily inefficient. Indeed, the evidence of remunicipalisation 
shows that the public sector is capable of delivering quality water services at a lower cost than 
the private sector. This is because abandoning the profit maximisation imperative of the 
private sector enables to reinvest profits for the development of the service. 
3. The public sector does not lack managerial capacity. Indeed, the evidence of 
remunicipalisation shows that public sector managers are capable of delivering quality water 
services while solving the problems inherited from privatisation. These problems may include 
the costs of terminating privatised contracts and the difficulties of transitioning from a 
fragmented private service to an integrated public service. These problems may also be 
compounded by new taxes or other payments imposed by national and local governments. 
4. The public sector does not lack access to finance. Indeed, the evidence of remunicipalisation 
shows that the public sector is capable of accessing investment finance at a lower cost than 
the private sector. This is because abandoning the profit maximisation imperative of the 
private sector enables to enhance financial sustainability. This is done by strengthening self-
financing, lowering indebtedness, and guaranteeing debt repayment with tariffs and taxation. 
5. The public sector is not unsustainable. The conventional wisdom is that the public sector is 
inflexible, bureaucratic and favours environmentally unsustainable approaches to 
infrastructure development. While these problems might have been more severe 40 to 50 
years ago,135 the evidence of remunicipalisation shows that today’s public sector is at the 
forefront of meeting the social and environmental challenges of the 21st century, such as the 
growing levels of water poverty that undermine the human right to water and the climate 
change emergency. This has increasingly led to the recognition that the public ownership, not 
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only of water but also energy services, has to be integral to attempts to tackle climate 
change.136           
 
Transformative remunicipalisation is possible 
Water remunicipalisation offers the possibility to reverse the unsustainable trajectory of privatisation 
and reorient water governance towards sustainable development outcomes and the realisation of the 
human right to water. As shown by the case of Paris, this change in institutional trajectory and the 
achievement of emancipatory and progressive outcomes rest on the transformative power of 
remunicipalisation. There are a number of transformations in governance that may take place with 
remunicipalisation, whereby change from private to public ownership should be seen as an enabling 
factor and not an end in itself. One important transformation is the change in the values that inform 
governance and that lead to a reinterpretation of the purpose and function of water service delivery, 
from one based on the extraction of commercial gain to one which sees water service provision as 
instrumental to the flourishing of human communities. It is this transformation that explains how 
remunicipalisation may represent a paradigm shift and may induce public operators to outperform 
their private predecessors in terms of promoting virtually all dimensions of sustainable water 
development.             
 
Democratic governance makes remunicipalisation transformative 
If the transformative power of remunicipalisation is underpinned by the enabling effect of public 
ownership, the process of achieving emancipatory and progressive outcomes may be strengthened by 
democratic and participatory governance. The case of Paris suggests that the transformative power of 
remunicipalisation is more likely to be sustained when political will is aligned to civil society’s 
expectations of the role of public services in supporting community development. In this case, in fact, 
the decision to remunicipalise came from the municipal authority after extensive consultations with 
workers and civic organisations. It was also sanctioned by the electorate in the 2008 municipal 
elections and participatory mechanisms were established to facilitate the continuation of a dialogue 
between the municipal government, the public enterprise and civil society.  
 
What makes remunicipalisation transformative is the insurgent leadership of democratic and diffuse 
governance, whereby leadership in promoting and taking radical initiatives to prioritise community 
development (both social and environmental) over market development may come from political 
actors such as municipal governments as well as social movements, civic organisations and citizens. 
By contrast, what makes remunicipalisation progressive is the inertia of governance mechanisms and 
managerial practices that may survive in the passage from private to public ownership. This survival 
can be explained by a combination of factors, including the interests of local governments and public 
managers that may persist despite remunicipalisation and a lack of insurgent leadership.  
 
Progressive remunicipalisation is desirable relative to privatisation 
The case of Berlin shows that remunicipalisation is not always transformative. When there is 
continuity between decision makers’ approach to organising and regulating water services 
respectively under remunicipalisation and privatisation, progressive remunicipalisation may bring 
moderate change in governance and practice. Nonetheless, even that moderate change can lead to 
some progress towards the realisation of the human right to water and enhancement of sustainable 
water development, compared to what has been the case under privatisation. In fact, the removal of 
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the profit maximisation imperative associated with privatisation makes the governance of 
remunicipalised water more flexible when it comes to allocating resources and prioritising efforts for 
the achievement of developmental objectives. This flexibility offers greater opportunities for actors 
ranging from regulatory authorities to social movements to redirect institutional trajectories towards 
the achievement of sustainable development objectives. 
 
Trade unions, workers and water remunicipalisation 
Trade unions and workers are in many cases apprehensive due to the uncertainty that 
remunicipalisation brings (like any other change in ownership).137 This apprehension is 
understandable. The evidence from our case studies shows that the nature of the relationship 
between trade unions and the new public owners and managers very much depends on the local 
context and that, as a result, working conditions may change or remain substantially unvaried without 
a clearly emerging pattern. There is, however, a question left open about the role that trade unions 
and workers may play in the face of institutional change and uncertainty. One possibility is that trade 
unions may build new political and social alliances that enable them to participate in insurgent 
leadership and contribute to direct the institutional trajectory of remunicipalised water services 
towards progressive outcomes.138 Whether this is a concrete possibility or not depends on the quality 
of labour relations and social dialogue in each city.      
 
The costs of remunicipalisation are an investment for the future 
The possibility of achieving emancipatory and progressive outcomes in the long term means that the 
short-term difficulties with transitioning from private to public ownership and the transaction costs of 
remunicipalisation should be assessed from a long-term perspective. In the case of Paris, the 
transaction costs of remunicipalisation were modest and even the transitional difficulties, albeit not 
insignificant, were overcome after three years of public operations. In the case of Berlin, the 
transaction costs of remunicipalisation were more substantial as a result of unilateral termination. 
Even in this case, however, the savings enjoyed by consumers thanks to a 7-year reduction in prices 
amounted to more than a third of these transaction costs. 
  





PUBLIC SERVICES INTERNATIONAL RESEARCH UNIT (PSIRU) 
Business Faculty, University of Greenwich, Park Row, Greenwich, London SE10 9LS, UK 
23 
Conclusions 
It is possible to offer the following conclusions. 
 
1. Better not to privatise than having to remunicipalise and face the costs of contract termination. 
2. The experience with remunicipalisation debunks the myths of the public sector that have 
contributed to the diffusion of water privatisation in the last 30 years. 
3. The transformative power of remunicipalisation offers the possibility to better achieve sustainable 
water development objectives. 
4. The transformative power of remunicipalisation is realised when political will is supported by 
democratic and participatory governance to deliver insurgent leadership. Trade unions and workers 
can contribute to strengthening participatory governance and insurgent leadership. 
5. Remunicipalisation is not always transformative as there may be continuity in the regulatory 
approach of decision makers under privatisation and remunicipalisation. 
6. Even progressive remunicipalisation may lead to more sustainable outcomes relative to 
privatisation. 
7. When planning for remunicipalisation, the possible difficulties with transitioning from private to 
public ownership and the transaction costs of remunicipalisation should be seen in a long-term 
perspective and thus seen as an investment in the future of next generations.  
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List of interviews 
Interview number Typology of actor Date of interview 
1 Utility manager (Paris) 4 April 2018 
2 Utility manager (Paris) 4 April 2018* 
3 Utility manager (Paris) 4 April 2018 
4 Utility manager (Paris) 4 April 2018 
5 Utility manager (Paris) 4 April 2018 
6 Civic organisation (Berlin) 28 May 2018 
7 Trade union (Berlin) 30 May 2018 
8 Utility manager (Paris) 13 February 2019** 
9 Utility manager (Paris) 3 October 2019*** 
 
*This interview was supplemented by electronic communication on 11 April 2018. 
**This interview was conducted by email communication. 
***This interview was conducted by email communication. 
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